THE New Republic

Texas Shows
Its Appreciation
By Ronnie Dugger

Pages 6-8

Four Proposals For Negotiating on Germany

by PERRY LAUKHUFF

The Authority of Scientists . . . . *Stephen Bailey*
Some Call It Conspiracy . . . . . *Frank Getlein*
Thomas Mann In Opera . . . . . *Robert Evett*

"THE FRENCH NATION"

Percy Winner — The Decline Before The Fall

Joseph Kraft — Why Algeria Will Win

FEBRUARY 24, 1958

25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire

Fox Guards Chicken

JUST A YEAR AGO (Feb. 21, 1957) we wrote an emotional piece about what Eisenhower was doing to America's fourth branch of government, the regulatory commissions. "Carefully, steadily and methodically," we said, "they are being stacked against the consumer interest and for business." The evidence is cumulative and we can't repeat it here. A congressional arch-foe of public housing was made administrator of public housing, two Congressmen who fought Reciprocal Trade agreements were put respectively on the tariff commission and the foreign trade agency, gas utility lawyer Kuykendall became chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and so on. The FTC and the TVA were packed. "The steady process of purging liberals and the consumer-minded has never stopped," we wrote and added, it is "here—here that the foxes are being let in to guard the chickens."

Well, the man running this grand campaign almost certainly is Sherman Adams. It is doubtful if Eisenhower even understands it. Certainly the public doesn't. When you replace one liberal by an ex-lobbyist on a regulatory commission it doesn't make news. But the Washington atmosphere has changed.

Here is how it works. Perhaps you remember how in the Administration's unsuccessful $100 million Dixon-Yates give-away a New York investment banker named Wenzell was discovered to be working both for the Administration and for the power lobby. The House was just about to vote $6.5 millions for the initial Dixon-Yates powerline. But the Security & Exchange Commission was scheduled to hold hearings June 13, 1955 which would disclose Wenzell's dual role. The Kefauver committee later discovered what happened. Chairman Sinclair Armstrong suddenly postponed the hearing and the House approved the money, June 16.

Under threat of contempt citation and after two prior refusals to testify Chairman Armstrong reluctantly revealed on oath that Sherman Adams secretly called him up June 11, 1955, and asked him to postpone the hearing. This was a direct and hidden intervention by one contestant before a quasi-judicial Federal agency, and the postponement was given without the other contestants being informed. Armstrong later explained to Kefauver the government had a "very, very great interest" in Dixon-Yates!

Chasing the Inquisitors

SHERMAN ADAMS' footprints are outside nearly every Federal regulatory agency. Now the curtain is lifted a little higher thanks to a former boy-prodigy, NY University law professor Bernard Schwartz (35) and his red-headed counsel Herbert Wachtell (25). The story is too complicated to recall in full: suffice it to say that in an investigation of regulatory agencies for a sub-committee Schwartz - Wachtell had turned up enough dirt and maneuvered a situation so that the white-washing full committee had to fire them, but at the same time had to justify itself by a public hearing.

This set the stage for what this reporter regards as one of the best shows he has ever seen in Washington. The glowering committee, led by Rep. Harris (D, Ark.), were out to make an example of this couple of quiz kids. The room was huge, the crowd vast, there were 70 newsmen. After a two-hour preliminary brow-beating Harris applied the match: "Now suppose they give some proof of their extraordinary, sensational charges against an FCC commissioner?" He sat back smiling.

What happened then was as if a couple of heretics at an auto-da-fe had suddenly leaped off the pyre of fagots and begun chasing the grand inquisitors! Schwartz in his thick lenses, Wachtell with his closely-cropped, wiry red hair, were subdued about it—they just kept dropping signed checks on to the table and citing as evidence the hitherto undisclosed wire-recording of the man accused. I have never seen a committee so taken aback. Whether the charges can be sustained I don't know but at the end of the first act the committee was not merely bruised but trying to defend itself.

Furthermore the FCC was only one of the six regulatory commissions on which Schwartz-Wachtell had begun inquiries. Titillating names were dropped; who applied pressure to get what multi-million dollar TV channel—or aviation route, say, from the Civil Aeronautics Board? How many other telephone calls did Sherman Adams make? Murray Chotiner, former Los Angeles promoter of Nixon mentioned by Schwartz, has since acknowledged that he did write Adams about an airline case pending before CAB—all very innocent, says Chotiner. Well, we may never know. Congressmen have been applying pressure too and Congress hates to investigate itself. (The Senate quickly ended its own lobbying investigation after Senator Case revealed the attempt to give him $2500 in oil money. As for Adams, he won't testify, claiming executive privilege.)

"A Little Suffering"

MEANWHILE the recession deepens. And while we are about it, let's reminisce a bit here, too. It was in July, 1957, that the highly respected *New York Journal of Commerce* reported editorially:

> The evidence now strongly points to the conclusion that both the Administration and the Federal Reserve authorities believe that a 'moderate recession now' would be a small price to pay for the avoidance of another boom-and-bust later on.

The newspaper attacked the policy.

Picking up the comment, syndicated financial columnist Sylvia Porter, August 1, in the *New York Post* said categorically that she knew it to be true. " . . . I KNOW" (Miss Porter's emphasis) "the editor of the *Journal of Commerce* has analyzed it accurately. I know this because again and again, in off-the-record conversations . . . in Washington this is what, in effect, I have heard: '. . . A little temporary suffering among a few millions of us now is far preferable to the risk of a prolonged suffering among all of us later . . . '."

The result—? America had 4,500,000 unemployed at mid-January, undergoing "a little temporary suffering," in the nation's first planned recession.

T.R.B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

1244 NINETEENTH ST., N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.
VOL. 138, NO. 8, ISSUE 2258
FEBRUARY 24, 1958

THE WEEK 3
Sports and Postoffices; Diplomat (laughter); "End of an Aftermath"; European Defense Costs; Ivan and Natasha; No Comment
ARTICLES 6
At That Houston Dinner by Ronnie Dugger
The Authority of Scientists Stephen K. Bailey
Algeria Is the Issue by Joseph Kraft
Egypt and Syria After Union by H. A. R. Philby
Germany: Four Proposals by Perry Laukhuff
Refugees—The Paper Chase by Martin Luray
BOOKS 17
ART 21
MUSIC 22

GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
MICHAEL STRAIGHT, *Editor-at-Large*
HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. Ruskin, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Alexander M. Bickel, Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Gerald W. Johnson, James E. King, Jr., Donald Malcolm, Helen Hill Miller

Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed to newsstands by the Eastern News Company, N. Y. 14, N. Y. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 25¢; Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00. Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new addresses. Copyright, 1958, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.

Correspondence

► *He Is Insulting Me!*

SIRS:

FOR the first time in my life I feel as though I must write one of those crusading letters at which I have sneered for many years. Since I am chronologically one of the charter members of the "beat generation" (age 27), I am

(Continued on page 23)

Sports and Postoffices

TWICE in the past two months *The Washington Post and Times Herald* has used freedom of the press purposefully and has thereby decisively influenced events—first with Chalmers Roberts' exclusive account on December 20 of the suppressed Gaither Report, and last week with Edward Folliard's exposure of that Houston GOP dinner. *The Post* thus gave less enterprising newspapers a glimpse of what independent journalism can do. And because the *Post* dug and found news, Washington bureaus of the cautious news agencies were able to let the country have the news without having to say it's so on their own authority.

☆

Speaking of the press, it was inventive of the *New York Herald Tribune* of February 10 to run a banner head—*Recession Seen Taking Over as No. 1 Political Issue*—above a page otherwise devoted to sports. The banner admirably forecast the week. First, from Capitol Hill came proposals for a tax cut to alleviate the recession, and demands that the Administration say what anti-recession measures it had in mind. Then, busy hours at the White House produced a Presidential statement and fact paper, affirming that come March things would be better, and that much has been done already. And at week's end, Eisenhower departed for 10 days sport on the George Humphrey plantation in Georgia.

In the President's statement, he noted that he had instructed Postmaster Summerfield to present a $2 billion program to Congress for the modernization of postoffices and equipment during the next three to five years, indicating that it was one public works program among a shelf-ful of others, to be brought down at timely moments. Mr. Summerfield said it was "not designed to be a public works program as such." Most of the $2 billion would be drawn from private sources of capital, with the government acquiring the resulting buildings under lease-purchase agreements. The $175 million proposed to be spent from public funds would be financed by raising to 5¢ the price of a stamp for out-of-town mail, and to 4¢ the rate for local letters. In proposing to pay for capital expenditures out of retained earnings from raised rates, the Administration is following the recent pattern in steel, automobiles and other business concerns whose quasi-monopoly position enables them to set administered prices.

☆

The doubts expressed in Congress about any quick pick-up in jobs from the postoffice program recalls past experience. A generation ago, when new post offices were thought of as a means of reviving purchasing power, Mr. Frank Bane queried Washington from the field as to the time needed to get plans and specifications in order. The reply indicated a requirement of about nine months. Bane telegraphed back: "This town wants a postoffice, not a baby."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Diplomat (laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you define a little more specifically for us what the United States interest is in the recent Tunisian crisis, what US objectives are in dealing with this situation?

A. We would like to see in Indonesia [sic] a Government which is constitutional and which reflects the real interest and desires of the people of Indonesia. As you know, there is a kind of a "guided democracy" trend there now which is an evolution which may not quite conform with the provisional constitution. . . . I think that there has been a growing feeling among the Moslems, particularly in the islands other than Java, a feeling of concern at growing Communist influence in the Government of Java. . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you probably misunderstood the last question. I think he asked about the Tunisian situation, sir, and you replied on the Indonesian. But could I ask the question again, sir?

A. Maybe the same answer applies (laughter).

AFTER this colloquy between Mr. Dulles and the press last week, one can only respond with uncomprehending gratitude to the Tunisian government's willingness to accept "the good offices" of our State Department (and the British) as mediators of the Tunisian-French dispute. For the Secretary managed in his answer not only to skid along the edge of insulting the Bourguiba government, but then to answer the wrong question wrongly.

Why wrongly? Because his answer was highly presumptuous. It is too late in the day to strip from the secretary his apostolic robe as defender of the Christian faith, but let us quickly—before he dons the *hadji* cap as well—challenge his competence to interpret "the feeling among Moslems" who, incidentally, constitute 90 percent of Indonesia's population. In view of the fact that one of Indonesia's orthodox Moslem groups (the N.U., or Moslem Teachers' Party) supports President Sukarno, it takes an inspired kind of brashness to imply that "*the* Moslems" are out of sympathy with Sukarno's government.

"End of an Aftermath"

SOME of the freshest economic thinking to cross our desk recently, free of the dead hand of past positions that encumbers most Washington thought, is in the annual report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. It diagnoses 1957 as the "end of an aftermath," the last postwar year. During that era, the pent-up desires of those who had money but couldn't get goods during the war, and those who didn't have money and couldn't get goods during the depression, were largely satisfied: the average age of automobiles shortened, the percent of homes with wiring and with electrical gadgetry lengthened, and the number of young families living with their in-laws dropped. At the same time, the per capita debt—federal, state and local, corporate, and consumer—grew, and the liquidity of commercial banks and corporations, and to a lesser extent of individuals, diminished. So it looks as if this particular party is over, and that an "interboom period" not of recession but of slower growth in output and income, higher unemployment, and, at the same time, inflation, might be ahead.

But if it is true that one group of voids in the economy has been filled sufficiently to put new business largely on a replacement basis, others have appeared—"schools, highways, water and sewage facilities, and missiles." If it is now accurate to refer to the postwar era in the past tense, if the bases for growth have changed, other bases exist, and could be just as strong.

The Philadelphia Reserve Bank's suggestion that the next source of economic growth may be extensive outlays in areas that are largely financed by government highlights the controversy that is shaping up between proponents of a tax cut and proponents of increased public spending as means of combatting the recession. Sen. Paul Douglas' proposal for creating a new lowest income-tax bracket, with a 15 percent rate applied to the first $1,000 of taxable income and a corresponding saving to the taxpayer of $50 in the tax on his first $2,000 of income, plus reduction of a variety of excise taxes, would cost the Treasury an estimated $4-to-$5 billion in income and put purchasing power in hands which would rapidly get it into circulation. The uses to which it would be put, however, would not increase the available supply of schools, sewers and satellites. An increase of $4-to-$5 billion in government expenditure for these purposes, while its economic impact would be slower, would on the other hand meet needs which if unmet now might later be the source of inflationary crash programs.

European Defense Costs

WHEN Germany joined NATO as an equal ally in 1955 she gave up the obligation she had held as a defeated enemy to pay the upkeep of the foreign troops on her territory, and no clear arrangement was settled about the contribution she would make toward the economic burden of allied defense during the period before her own military forces were fully established. At the same time Britain reserved the right to ask NATO for financial help if the cost of maintaining her forces in Germany imposed too heavy a burden on her foreign exchange.

Though last year Germany did provide £50 million toward the upkeep of British troops on her soil, she has refused to pay a penny next year. The most she has offered after months of hard bargaining is to advance Britain £100 million against the purchases of arms she

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ivan and Natasha

LOOK, Natasha, look. I can read English," said Ivan.

"Look, Ivan, look, look. I can write English," said Natasha.

"Look, look," they both said. "We are little Russians but we can read and write English."

"You read English very well, Ivan. You write English very well, Natasha," said their teacher. "You read and write English as well as American boys and girls. Comrade Khrushchev will be happy."

"Does Comrade Khrushchev look after American boys and girls too?" ask Natasha.

"No, no," said the teacher. "No, no, no. Comrade Khrushchev does not look after the Americans. Not yet."

"Then who looks after the Americans?" asked Natasha.

"The Americans have a government," said the teacher. "The government is in Washington. Who can describe the American government?"

"I can. I can," cried Ivan. "It is neo-anti-crypto-proto-fascist."

"Very good, Ivan," said the teacher. "That is correct."

"The American government is also awful stupid," said Natasha.

"Awful*ly* stupid," said the teacher. "Why do you say that, Natasha?"

"Because it does not make nice schools for American boys and girls to study in," said Natasha. "When Ivan and I grow up, we will be able to read and write English very well. When the American children grow up, they will not be able to read and write Russian at all."

"Most of them will not even read *English* very well," said Ivan, laughing.

"To say nothing of blueprints," said the teacher.

Questions

1. Why are Ivan and Natasha learning English?
2. Why doesn't the American government build schools?
3. What is a government for?
4. What did the teacher mean by that last crack?

hopes to make from Britain in the next three years. In terms of hard cash this is the equivalent of a loan which would save Britain about £10 million in interest.

A special visit of the NATO Secretary-General to Bonn has failed to produce any softening of the German position. Feeling in Britain is running high. German rearmament has proceeded much more slowly than originally promised, and at present Britain is paying twice as much as Germany on defense as a whole. Germany's gold and dollar reserves, on the other hand, are twice as high as those of Britain, partly because of the immense inflow of foreign currency via the NATO armies in Germany. And although Germany claims that she could not meet Britain's demand for a further £50 million of support costs without impairing her financial stability, her Finance Minister has just announced tax concessions of some £175 million in the coming year.

As a result Britain is likely to face NATO as a whole with an ultimatum—either the alliance makes it financially possible for Britain to continue her contribution toward its present strategy, or Britain will insist on a change in that strategy which will enable her to withdraw still more troops from Germany. At present the British Rhine Army is almost wholly responsible for the defense of the North German plain. The withdrawal of further British troops beyond the number already planned will force NATO as a whole to adopt a peripheral strategy—or at least to abandon the idea of local defense in favor of total reliance on the "tripwire" which triggers off total war.

But if, as is now possible, NATO does give up the search for collective ground defense forces and relies wholly on the deterrent of nuclear air power, that would have a sharp impact on the diplomacy of the Western alliance. A "tripwire" strategy, for example, would not require that NATO's frontier remain the Elbe, since there would be no need for defense in depth. And under these circumstances, a policy of military disengagement might then commend itself to Germany's allies whatever the views of Germany herself.

No Comment

"AMERICA'S mighty missile program takes a giant step into outer space as Jupiter C puts America's first satellite into orbit.

"And once again, the world is shown that inventiveness and productivity thrive best in the climate of freedom.

"To help preserve this, Chrysler Corporation. . . ."

From an ad in Life, *February 17*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AT THAT HOUSTON DINNER . . .

Any Friend of Oil Is a Friend of Ours

by RONNIE DUGGER

Austin, Texas

THE TRUTH about American politics, that money governs, so basic, so blinding, so unbearable, may be seen but not said, acted on but not admitted, whispered but not written: that is the plain meaning of the national funk over the Porter letter and the natural gas bill.

How else can all the fuss be understood? So H. J. (Jack) Porter, the Republican national committeeman from Texas and the party's state finance chairman, did tell the oilmen they'd better put up or they might not get that nice gas bill. That was true, wasn't it?

Joe Martin, the GOP's leader in the House, was to be the speaker at a standard Republican fund-raising dinner in Houston. Thousands of notices were mailed out, none of them referring to legislation, but on January 30 Porter, a forthright man, mailed to about 25 people he knew as Republicans (and, obviously, as oilmen) personal letters on Republican National Committee stationery bearing his and national chairman Meade Alcorn's names. In these letters he said:

> Joe Martin . . . has always been a friend of Texas, especially of the oil and gas producing industries. He mustered two-thirds of the Republican votes in the House each time the gas bill passed. . . . As Speaker of the 83rd Congress he led the fight for adoption of the tidelands ownership bill.
>
> It will be up to Joe Martin to muster at least 65 percent of the Republican votes in order to pass the gas bill this year. . . . He has to put Republican members from Northern and Eastern consuming areas on the spot politically because the bill is not popular due to the distortion of facts by newspaper columnists and others.
>
> The dinner must raise substantial amounts of money for the Republican Party as part of these will go towards the election of Republican Congressmen and Senators.

Now what was wrong with this? It's true Martin (like Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn) runs oil industry errands in the Congress. It's true he would have been in charge of producing the House GOP votes for the gas bill. But Porter breached the code in *adding* it would be fitting if "substantial amounts of money" were raised.

The Washington Post's Edward Folliard reported the letter's contents under the headlines, "Texans Raise Fund, Fete Martin in Hope of Easing Gas Curbs . . . State GOP Dinner Netting $100,000 May Earn Billions." The reactions were immediate, spastic, and fatal for the Harris-O'Hara bill to relieve gas producers of federal controls over how much they can soak American consumers. Alcorn, with President Eisenhower's express approval, righteously refused to touch a one of the ten million pennies raised at the dinner. ("Not one cent of that money is going into the Republican National Committee," as Mr. Hagerty put it.)

The dinner itself, held in the same Rice Hotel banquet hall in which Sen. Lyndon Johnson (D., Texas) was appreciated several weeks before, must have been a disappointment to the guests who came because of Porter's letter. Apart from an aside that "the five percenters have had to look in places other than government to ply their trade" under the Eisenhower administration, Martin didn't give even the *Democratic Digest* grist for irony.

Porter told the 500 banqueters that about 1,000 tickets had been sold at $100 apiece, but he couldn't say exactly how much money had been raised because returns from a dinner of this kind were as slow coming in as the returns "from a famous primary in Duval County" (a reference Sen. Johnson no doubt thought indelicate, since 'twas he who was elected a senator in 1948 by the very late returns from the famous Box 13 in Duval).

Porter, the chairman of the dinner committee, is a "medium-rich" oilman; Ralph A. Johnston, the toastmaster, is an oilman; Corbin Robertson, who introduces

---

RONNIE DUGGER, *a frequent contributor, is editor of the independent weekly,* The Texas Observer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Martin, is an oilman—in fact, everybody on the program was in the oil business except the clergyman, who couldn't very well have been (though one never knows in Texas), and Martin himself. Fourteen of the 34 dinner sponsors from Houston are in oil; half a dozen members of the women's committee are oil wives, including Mrs. William H. Francis, Jr., whose husband is the assistant secretary of defense in the Eisenhower cabinet. Even the printed program carried out the oil motif. Of Martin it said: "Texans are grateful . . . Joe Martin was instrumental in the passage of 1946 crude oil price decontrol legislation; rallied two-thirds of House Republican votes in support of gas industry decontrol legislation; provided the leadership under which Republican Ways and Means Committee members have supported continually the depletion allowance provision of income tax law . . . "

WHILE the dinner was for Republicans, its sponsors included twelve of the 30 Houston sponsors of the Lyndon Johnson testimonial. Texas Gov. Price Daniel (D.) was miffed that so many Texans had contributed to the GOP. "Porter should give the money back to the people and let them come into the Democratic Party," he said. "Most of them are Democrats like he (Porter) used to be. Half of them have no business in the Republican Party." In other words, Daniel was saying, the Texas Democratic Party is as faithful an Oil Party as the Texas GOP. This is, of course, true enough of the right wing of the state party Daniel heads—he once said he didn't see how anybody could get elected in Texas without oil money—and Texas Democrats in Congress have always supported the gas bills, the depletion allowance, and lower oil imports.

Ralph Yarborough, the new senator from Texas, who supports depletion and low imports but recently declined to tell several hundred oilmen in Houston whether he would vote for the gas bill, criticized Porter's letter without committing himself on the bill. Sen. Johnson, whom Porter once opposed as a Republican in the general election, was silent. Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas would not say whether he will bring the bill to a vote but added that if Porter had wanted to kill it he couldn't have been more effective. Rep. Frank Ikard of Texas said Porter has "killed the bill dead—It will hurt everything the industry and Texas is interested in—restricting oil imports and keeping the 27.5 percent oil depletion." In this same rather jumpy vein, Gov. Daniel had complained that the episode furnishes "enemies of our state propaganda," is another affair "which northern and eastern writers gleefully build up in their prejudicial attacks on our state and many of its interests."

What is to become of the "hot money"? After it had been spurned in Washington, Porter, to whom these spats are not new (for in 1954 he wrote federal workers in Texas asking for contributions to the Republicans, saying GOP headquarters needed cash to "process" fed-

"I've told you fifty times—Not at the front door!"

eral patronage appointments; in 1956 he was charged with asking office holders for five percent of their government salaries for the GOP) said blandly the money would be used by the state Republicans. But then the chairmen of the Senate and House Republican campaign committees decided the intensity of the national party's indignation was no match for the hundred grand. Sen. Schoeppel (R.-Kan.) said the letter was "unfortunate," but the GOP Senate committee would not reject the money. Rep. Simpson (R.-Pa.) called the letter "crude and inexcusable," but the money would be accepted by the House GOP committee. Since, as Porter explained, the money ordinarily would have gone to the Republican National Committee and thence, in part, to those very campaign committees, the question can fairly be asked whether the Republicans were more concerned with what they said was a taint on the cash or with how to get their hands on it without the voters noticing.

As though to confirm that one may, in American politics, buy legislation with wealth the legislation then helps to perpetuate, but that one may not admit this, the first seven comments on the Porter affair in Texas daily newspapers deplored Porter's candor about the truth but accepted that very truth as necessary.

The *El Paso Herald-Post* and *Houston Press* sneered at "the heavy-handed oil millionaires" and Porter's "frank statement of purpose for the fund" but said the bill itself

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"had merit." The *Corpus Christi Caller* condemned Porter's "naïveté" and "political stupidity" and said he "should seek a little professional advice on politics." The *Houston Post* viewed with alarm gas bill opponents' distortion of "simple, honest actions and words."

"Mr. Porter's Grievous Political Blunder," groaned the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*. "The furor over this piece of *mere truth-telling*" (italics supplied) should teach Mr. Porter, the newspaper said, "that frankness is not considered a political virtue. . . .

> It goes without saying that many of the sources of these party campaign funds expect something in return. Often they are interested in specific legislation. The political sin is in saying it, and especially, as Mr. Porter did, in reducing it to writing. "Don't write"—far more, it sometimes seems, than "do right"—is a cardinal rule of politics.

The *Dallas News* pleaded, for Mr. Porter, "practical politics," and said his error was in "being above board as to what candidates who might be helped by the money would stand for, to wit, the natural gas bill. . . . It stands to reason [the natural gas industry] want to elect congressmen who agree with them."

The *News* tried to distinguish between bribery and untainted contributions with somewhat inconclusive results. "Tell a candidate, 'Vote for such-and-such a bill, and I'll donate $1,000 to your campaign,' that's bribery. . . . But if the candidate's friends ask you to contribute $1,000 because he is for what you believe in, but with no guarantee, as a donor you would be doing a natural thing done every day in politics." Although this "natural thing done every day in politics" is what Mr. Porter alluded to, and only indirectly, the *News* did not assay to explain why the reaction to so natural a situation had been so profound.

EVEN less inhibited about the depressing realities was the Dallas *News* columnist Lynn Landrum. "Fat cats are necessary in politics. But they should be neither seen nor heard," he wrote. What was Porter to do, with so few Republicans in Texas?:

> Why, you hunt up a fat cat who has his tail caught in the door, and you offer him the hope of a better day. . . . then you delicately edge up to telling him that he can either chip in on the GOP fund or starve to death. Of course, you do. How else do you suppose you raise money for political purposes in this land of the free and home of the brave? Oil men, insurance men, bankers, contractors and so on and on all knew about it. Anybody in position to write a valid check of potent size has knowledge of all this. It is no secret.

Well, if the Porter letter was nothing else, it was a purgative for the Texas dailies. Accustomed as they are to the practical connections between advertising and editoralizing, they enjoyed snickering at Porter's simplicity. But how can they now refute Sen. Richard Neuberger (D.-Ore.), who responded to the affair by advocating financing of political campaigns out of the general revenue? "The Texas episode," he said, "shows the nation a situation which has existed for years regarding politics in the United States. This is the fact, that most huge campaign donations are given in expectation of governmental policies which will favor or benefit the donor."

ONE supposes after all that *The Washington Post* was right to play up the Porter letter. There must be many Easterners who still doubt the truism that most oilmen, and most other rich men, contribute their millions to politics for their own further enrichment. But these provincials pass me. They need to come down here to the tap-roots of civilization and learn a thing. Then, if they still insist on burrowing along their dark little subways, perhaps they can be brought to see the truth by the angry common sense of a British MP, Anthony Lewis, in a letter he is said to have written to constituents who had complained of the budget for the year 1714:

"Gentlemen," he wrote,

"I have received your letter about the excise, and am surprised at your insolence in writing me at all.

"You know, and I know, that I bought this constituency. You know, and I know, that I am now determined to sell it, and you know what you think I don't know, that you are now looking out for another buyer, and I know, what you certainly don't know, that I have now found another constituency to buy.

"About what you said about the excise: May God's curse light upon you all, and may it make your homes as open and free to the excise officers as your wives and daughters have always been to me while I have represented your rascally constituency."

I suggest H. J. (Jack) Porter address another letter to his Republican oilmen, giving them an even better lesson in "private enterprise and a free economy."

"Gentlemen," he can write,

"You have heard the furor about my earlier letter, and are no doubt surprised at the insolence of the common press in desecrating free enterprise correspondence.

"You know, and I know, that we oilmen buy legislation. You know, and I know, that we are now determined to buy a gas bill, and you know what our Chairman thinks I don't know, that if we cannot buy enough Republicans, we will buy as many Democrats as we can, and I know, what our Great Leader certainly doesn't know, that we have about run out of constituencies to buy.

"About what the radicals now say of the fate of the gas bill: May God's curse light upon them all, and may it make their homes as open and free to our gas-bill collectors as Texas politicians and Washington Republicans have always been to me while I have represented our rascally party."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMUNICATION

A Plea for Limiting the Authority of Scientists

SIRS:

THERE is something incredibly sad about the proposal of the 12 distinguished scientists "For Civilian Leadership in the Space Age" (*NR*, February 3, 1958). The desire to be free of the torment of living among men is not peculiar to scientists; but the belief that utopia can be reached by springing scientists loose from all earthbound responsibilities is leaden with pathos and danger. The mind goes back to some of H. G. Wells, or Brook Farm, or the *Civitas Solis* of Thomas Campanella—or to any one of a score of Utopias after which men have hungered and about which they have pondered. And the mind always rebels against the rude reminder of that early scientist, Sir Francis Bacon, that utopias cannot exist because the idols of the "tribe," and the "cave," and the "market-place," and the "theatre" always louse up the best laid plans of mice and men.

These scientists don't want *civilian* leadership in the space age; they want *scientific license* in a polity and economy structured to give them peace of mind. *Look* at these statements:

> It [the Space Commission chaired by a scientist, with scientists holding a majority vote] should have *all necessary authority* to decide an issue on its scientific merits without regard to irrelevant political considerations of interservice rivalry.
>
> Let us be nationalistic to the extent that we move ahead vigorously with our own resources *without permitting the red tape of international agreements* to delay our research and development.
>
> Let the attention and energy of men be diverted away from this troubled planet of armed camps in which we live, and diverted towards the conquest of outer space instead of towards the conquest of each other.
>
> The organization operating the project should be neither a profit-seeking corporation nor directly an agency of the government. . . . The disadvantage of direct government operation is *the excessive amount of red tape* which is then involved.

These are the laments of men whose test tubes are murky, not from impure water, but from imperfections in the glass; but who insist the murk will disappear if you change the water. They favor project-centered research because the Manhattan project and the radar project worked. But these were successful because of the controls over manpower and material which all-out war made possible. Why should scientists be given "all necessary authority" if the consequence of "all necessary authority" is to make the world safe for scientists alone? There is at least a doubt that all good things that have happened in the world have happened because of scientists. I can think of some stinking things that have resulted from scientific endeavors. The underlying assumption that all scientists are really intelligent and decent chaps so you can afford to spring them loose from the controls and worries that beset the rest of mankind is maddening whether looked at as arrogance or naïveté.

I am not one of those who believes that an expert must always "be on tap rather than on top," but the 12 "distinguished physicists and chemists" have strengthened the plausibility of that old saw. I for one am not willing to give over my life and fortunes to a Commission with "all necessary authority" to enable a few scientists to tell other scientists where they can or must work. And if this is not what the "12 distinguished" meant, how are they going to get away from "irrelevant political considerations" of not only interservice, but interbureau, interdepartmental, and interbranch rivalry on the use of limited manpower resources? And what sanctions are to be used to stop industry from wasteful practices of hoarding scientific talent? And, if you set up a separate Department of Science and Technology of cabinet rank, what will it include? The proposed Space Commission? All science and technology in the military? All science in the Public Health Service? In the Patent Office? In the Geological Survey? In the Bureau of Plant Entymology? All science education?

"Let the attention and energy of men be diverted away from this troubled planet. . . . " "Sorry, Mr. President, we can't spare that physiologist to help set up a research center for human ills in Nigeria; sorry, Mr. President, priority for Zeta precludes sending engineering experts to build dams to provide irrigation for India; sorry, Mr. President, you know the act gave us 'all necessary authority'."

CIVILIAN leadership in the space age is most devoutly needed, and there may be good reasons for setting up a new administrative structure to deal with problems of space. But until a scientist can prove that the hydrogen bomb makes me happier than a square meal and a symphony, or that something can be found in space to ease the torment of my fellows, I'll fight to the finish his attempts to determine without interference how the resources of this world are to be used.

STEPHEN K. BAILEY

Nuffield College, Oxford

PROFESSOR BAILEY *directs graduate studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Algeria—Not Tunisia—Is The Pivotal Issue

If the Tunisian-Algerian border massacre and the Tunisian demand that all French troops be evacuated serve to focus sustained attention on the Algerian war, the victims will not have died in vain. For any facing up to the facts must show that France cannot possibly win that conflict. Inside Algeria, in the teeth of a French force of half-a-million, the Algerian front for national liberation has raised an army of at least 30,000 men, uniformed, equipped with small arms (including machine guns), and led by officers vetted in the French army or in FLN training schools. It performs in the back country many of the offices of local government—administration, education, public health, education, and on a rudimentary scale, social security and economic planning. It collects, on a regular basis, tax contributions from the 400,000 Algerian Moslems working in France. Its leadership—vested in a nine-man executive committee and a fifty-three-man national council—the prototypes for a future cabinet and legislature—maintain permanent offices in Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, and at the United Nations in New York. Only the recognition problem—fear of a Communist embrace and a Western cold shoulder—has prevented the FLN, so far, from proclaiming itself a Government-in-Exile.

☆

Popularity is of course difficult to gauge with precision. My impression, after six weeks in Algeria with the French and three behind the lines with the nationalists, is that the FLN commands wide and enthusiastic support among the Moslem population. In village after village, when I was with the nationalists, the whole population, including old men, youngsters and especially the women who identify emancipation with the nationalist cause, would stream out to greet us. The most menial services—preparing food, washing clothes, sewing uniforms, shaving beards, sentry duty—were performed by the villagers without the slightest sign of irritation. Day and night the nationalist soldiers walked openly through the villages—a mark of absolute confidence, for any dissidents could have betrayed them to the French, who were sometimes stationed less than a mile away.

Even in the cities which the French control and among Moslems working for the French, I had the impression of ill-suppressed loyalty to the nationalists. On two separate occasions when I was traveling under French auspices, Moslems working for the French not only confessed themselves nationalists, but took the risk of putting me in touch with their nationalist friends. The French themselves acknowledge that they don't trust the highest Moslem civil servant in their Algerian administration. "He'll probably be the first Finance Minister of the free Algeria," one French official told me.

Even if the nationalists were a weak, splinter group, however, Algerian independence would be inevitable. Take geography first. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco—the "Maghreb," as Arabs have been calling the North African tryptique since the 8th Century—make up a single ethnic bloc. Nationals of the three territories, practically indistinguishable in manner and appearance, are bound by ties of language, religion, blood and common historical experience. But for better or worse—and it is by no means certainly for better—Tunisia and Morocco are independent. To suppose that in the long run two thirds of the Maghreb can be independent and the other third something else is to dream.

Nothing better demonstrates the solidarity of the three territories than the curious positions of President Bourguiba and King Mohammed V of Morocco. Both rulers have knowingly opened their territories to the Algerian nationalists for use as bases of operations and privileged sanctuaries. In a very real sense, the private self-interest of both leaders would dictate an opposite course. From the King's point of view, the Algerian nationalists are dangerous as republicans; they will throw their influence, once independence is established, to the not unimportant group of Moroccan political leaders who want to curb the monarch's power. As to Bourguiba, many of the Algerians are contemptuous of Tunisia as a tiny country; if they do not on gaining independence swallow it up, they will certainly act to diminish Bourguiba's personal importance. But so great is the popular support in Morocco and Tunisia for Algerian independence that the two leaders have no choice. They would be out of power in a matter of days if they did not help.

Similarly ineluctable is the working of the population tide. There are roughly nine million Moslems and a million Europeans in Algeria. Responsibility for the large European minority—the largest, except for South Africa, anywhere outside the "white-man's lands," and including some third and fourth generation residents of Algeria—is the most commonly advanced reason for French rule of Algeria. But in fact, the relative size of the European minority is rapidly shrinking. While the European population is relatively stagnant, the Moslem community of Algeria is doubling its numbers every quarter-century. By 1980, the Europeans will be outnumbered eighteen to one!

Even were this not so, the cost to France of perpetual occupation would be prohibitive. Like so many of the under-developed countries, Algeria is an economically barren land without any present prospect of producing enough wealth to support its population. It is a heavily deficit economy. As matters stand now, the largest single source of wealth in the country is the expenditures of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the French administration for public works, salaries and social service payments. The second largest source of income is remittance money—the portion of their wages sent back home by the nearly 400,000 Algerians working in France.

Despite this powerful economic shot in the arm from France, however, there are more than a million un- or under-employed persons in Algeria, and the Moslem standard of living is desperately low. It has been estimated (by Mlle. Germaine Tillon, perhaps the leading French authority on Algeria) that to maintain something like full employment, and to meet social service obligations to the growing Moslem population (I don't speak of the military "pacification"—costing around $2 billion a year), France would have to spend in Algeria more than $1 billion a year over the next twenty years.

Nor will Saharan oil dye the red ink black. There is oil in the Sahara, and lots of it. It is, moreover, of special importance to France, because it is franc oil, and can thus wipe out the large portion of the annual French dollar deficit accumulated through dollar oil purchases. Still, the most reliable estimate I have seen figures on an annual production of 20 million tons which, with oil going at $20 a ton, comes to $400 million. Assuming there were no costs—and as a matter of fact costs of drilling in the Sahara and moving the oil out tend to be high—the $400 million would hardly offset the $1 billion required to maintain the Algerian standard of living. Moreover, while the war goes on, the French have no chance of bringing out the oil in important quantities. Six hundred miles—including a long stretch of rough mountainous terrain, ideal for the nationalist guerrillas—lie between the Saharan wells and the Mediterranean coast. In the past month, the nationalists have twice blown the rail line the French are using to transport a trickle of oil. Any sizable flow would require a pipeline, and that would be even easier for the rebels to blow up.

The best—indeed, the only—chance the French have to get the oil out is to grant independence and then work out an agreement with the Algerian Government, or to arrange the two simultaneously. That something like this will be done is the working hypothesis of the Paris bankers who have raised the money for the Saharan explorations. *"Pour toucher le petrole, il faut la paix,"* one of them told me last fall.

This applies as well to the protection of the European minority in Algeria. It can have no absolute guarantee that it will live in peace and prosperity after independence. But the example of the 350,000 Europeans living in Morocco suggests it is possible. The presence of a large number of Algerian Moslems in France, in addition, would serve as a check on the Algerian nationalists if, after independence, they had any idea of behaving as the Indonesians have been behaving to Dutch residents.

There is one final argument against independence, more realistic it seems to me, than the danger of losing the Saharan oil or endangering Algeria's European population. It is the argument that independence will bring Communism to Algeria. The theory, in its most subtle form, is that French public opinion, bitter and disillusioned at independence, would force the Paris Government to wash its hands completely of Algeria. Without some French subsidy, the Algerian economy would very quickly be in catastrophic straits. The nationalist Government would turn for help to the United States which could not, or would not, shoulder the burden. The door would then be open for the Russians. Here again, there is no absolute assurance this will not happen. But here, too, the longer the war goes on, the greater the chance for new explosions which can be nothing but disastrous for the West.

JOSEPH KRAFT

The Prime Minister of Tunisia on the French Presence

(The following comments of Habib Bourguiba were made in December, 1956, in the course of an interview with a special correspondent of The New Republic)

M. GUY MOLLET, Premier of France, recently stated "there is no peace in servitude." I am seldom in accord with M. Mollet, but here we agree without reserve. He used the phrase for Hungary. This is true for Hungary, and why should it be otherwise in the case of Algeria? As long as our brothers in Algeria are bleeding to death, there can be no hope for moderation in the Middle East. . . .

The French conceal the truth about Algeria, both for home consumption and in fear of United Nations action. The Algerians will fight until they win. The French are already in retreat and can only hold isolated sections by overwhelming force. The minute they move their troops from a "pacified" area, the Algerians take over again. If it takes 50 years, the Algerians will win. The only way for France to put down the nationalist movement would be to slaughter every Algerian. Nor can you expect newly-freed colonial peoples to reject seductive offers from the Soviet Union when they see the United States supporting—even if only passively—French policy in Algeria. You may be able to explain complex motives to highly-educated persons. But for the masses, a man is not your friend when he countenances your enemy and, conversely, is worthy of your friendship if he hates your enemy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Comes After Union of Egypt and Syria?

THE UNION of Egypt and Syria is, as Denis Healey has noted in these pages, the end of a beginning. The beginning consisted mostly of words, billions on billions of words poured out in cafe discussion, newspapers, books, political speeches and state declarations of intention and policy: all adding up to a single phrase, "Arab unity."

A plebiscite will be held on February 21 to approve the union, and to elect Colonel Nasser its first President. (The sentence has an odd ring in Western ears, yet it is literally true.) President Nasser will then appoint the members of the Central Government in Cairo, the two Chairmen of the Regional Executive Councils for Egypt and Syria, and the members of the National Assembly. The merger of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs is expected to take two to three months; the unification of policy and administration in respect of finance, industry, trade, law, education and the rest may take as long as three years. Certain local differences may be allowed to persist indefinitely, just as local administration in Scotland has differed from that of England for 250 years without materially prejudicing the union of the two countries.

Will union work? The list of problems to be tackled sounds formidable: currency, taxation, tariffs, banking practice, land-holding, administration of justice, army pay, school textbooks, hospital charges; a host of others could be added. But all these problems are in reality simple, and should be well within the compass of Arab resources and experience. Indeed, they are trivial in comparison, for instance, with the monstrous complexities of preparing the annual budget of the United States, or maintaining the stability of the sterling area.

The most difficult step has already been taken. Personal, sectional and regional obstacles to union have been swept away in a flood of acclamation. Much of the acclamation is absurd hyperbole; but, harnessed by astute tacticians, it has achieved its object.

The driving force behind the movement toward union in Syria was the Baath-Socialist Party under Akram Haurani, who has now emerged, in his early 40's, as a towering figure on the Syrian stage. The party was the strongest single element in the coalition government that ruled Syria for the past year. But the coalition also included Khalid Al Azm, the ambitious architect of the Syrian-Soviet economic aid agreements, who was never an easy ally. By choosing to spearhead the movement toward union under Nasser, the Baath-Socialists made themselves a friend against whom even Khalid al Azm was helpless. By the same stroke, they scotched their over-rated rivals on the Left—the Syrian Communists. Thus another Dulles nightmare ended with a whimper. The firm lead given to the union movement by the Baath-Socialists assures them a loud voice in the councils of the United Arab Republic.

At home, the Baath-Socialists are radical rather than socialist. Abroad they are neutralists and nationalists in the pan-Arab sense. They aspire to a greater Arab nation, republican and "progressive," stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian (or rather "Arab") Gulf. Service under Nasser should cause them no pain. More immediately important is the possible effect of union on the Syrian-Soviet economic aid agreements. Right-wing circles in Syria are spreading reports that the suppression of the Syrian Communists will prejudice Soviet aid. This is firmly denied in official circles. There is even a suggestion that the Soviet Government has offered to bring the Syrian agreements into line with those concluded later with Egypt, which are slightly more favorable to the Arabs. But whatever the future of the agreements, and the results of the Anglo-Egyptian conversations in Rome, one thing is certain: *the United Arab Republic will not abate its suspicions of Western policy.* It sees the path to full Arab unity blocked by Britain or by America, or by both, in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Aden and the Persian Gulf. Both President Nasser and President Shukru Quwatli, in valedictory speeches to their respective parliaments, went out of the way to stress their adherence to the position of "positive neutrality between the power blocks."

The movement toward unity will not stop with Egypt and Syria—or with the oddity of Yemenite adhesion. The records of Nasser and of Akram Haurani alike rule out any such conclusion. The proclamation of union contained a pointed invitation to other Arab states to join on either a unitary or federal basis. The invitation will certainly be pressed—politely or peremptorily, according to circumstance.

THE mention of federation is bait for the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan, which might otherwise argue that the constitution of the United Arab Republic—avowedly "a presidential republic"—precluded their membership. Whether Iraq or Jordan will take the bait is more than doubtful. The Hashemite dynasties are the only serious bar to complete domination of the two countries by Nasser. How long would they last if they submitted to even a partial embrace? The first reaction of the two kings was to consider federating themselves, so as to argue the toss with Nasser from a position of greater strength. They would derive much comfort if Saudi Arabia also could be induced to join a confederacy of Arab monarchies. But King Saud pursues his cautious path with the minimum of words. It is most unlikely that he would join any Arab club of which Nasser was not a founder-member.

If the regimes of Jordan and Iraq hold aloof from the union, appeals will certainly be made direct to their peoples with a revival of bitter anti-Hashemite attacks. Nasser must surely calculate that attacks issuing not from "Egypt" and "Syria," but from the nucleus of a pan-Arab union, would carry more weight than earlier ones. In my judgment, the Colonel would probably be right.

H. A. R. PHILBY

Beirut

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMANY

Four Proposals and a Dissent to George Kennan

by PERRY LAUKHUFF

MUCH AS ONE may agree with Mr. Acheson's critical comments on some points, George Kennan's recent Reith lectures over the BBC are to be welcomed. With respect to Germany, the lectures express the same vast dissatisfaction which I feel over the fact that our diplomacy has become stuck fast—not on principles, because these are sound, but on means for giving life to the principles.

To a certain extent, Mr. Kennan has been misinterpreted. As I read his remarks on Germany, he throws out various suggestions largely for the purpose of introducing some motion into our thought:

> My plea is only that we remember that we have a problem here, which must sooner or later be solved, and better sooner than later; and that we do our best to see that the positions we adopt with relation to it are at all times as hopeful and constructive as they can be made.

For some years now, our government has been content to repeat complacently the formula of free all-German elections arranged by the Four Powers, with the subsequently reunited Germany free to enter any international grouping it pleases. We have been secure in the almost certain knowledge that this grouping could only be NATO. Now, I do not quarrel with this formula. I played my own small part in evolving it. It is justifiable on principle and it was originally justifiable as an opening gambit in talking with the Soviet Union. The trouble is that we have never let the discussion get beyond it.

Mr. Kennan has thrown out some provocative suggestions. I do not think they are all by any means acceptable. I say this with reluctance, for I greatly respect and admire Mr. Kennan and his analytical powers. I served under him in Berlin in 1940-1941, and have often been associated with him since. But on Germany he seems frequently to be not at his best, sometimes starting from strange premises and proceeding to what I would regard as unsound conclusions.

In his Reith lectures he says, for instance, that he knows "of no basic issues of genuine gravity between Russia and the West other than those arising directly from the manner in which the recent world war was allowed to come to an end." Is this not incomprehensible as a premise? Can one seriously assert that if the war had ended otherwise or if all our war-born problems with Russia were to be solved tomorrow by some miracle, there would then be no issues between us? Mr. Kennan, of all people, knows only too well the problems that exist because of insistent Soviet-Communist attempts to penetrate and overthrow capitalist societies. Does the impending race for the conquest of space spring out of unresolved World War II issues?

Again, Mr. Kennan says that "there can be no Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe unless this entire area can in some way be removed as an object in the military rivalry of the Great Powers." First of all, in Germany the Soviets are *not* in Eastern Europe, they are in Western Europe. In any event, it is anything but clear to me that a political and military rearrangement in the German area would of itself make possible or necessary a Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe proper. The Russians are there for additional reasons than the mere fact that we are in Germany. It seems curiously blind for Mr. Kennan to appear to ignore this. In fact, elsewhere he takes note of other reasons for the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. The Russians are plainly there to assure a continuation of their system in all that region. They want to be sure that Communist political regimes and collectivist economic systems remain firmly fastened on the societies peripheral to the Communist homeland. They feel safer thus, as Russia has historically felt safer, when neighbored by a ring of subservient states. They feel more successful—and Communism thrives only on expansion, not contraction. The Soviet voice in the world is more resonant because Eastern Europe is part of the voice-box. They want to use the Warsaw Pact as a pawn against NATO. Their presence in Eastern Europe puts them "next door" to Western Europe, and, by that much, makes their "numerous" opportunities for pressure more worrisome to the democrats and more heartening to the Communists. This is not a simple situation and there will be no simple answer to it, however attractive the word "disengagement" may be.

To take one more example, Mr. Kennan seems to

PERRY LAUKHUFF'S *sixteen years in the Foreign Service included posts as Chief of the Political Section for Political Adviser Robert Murphy in the US Military Government in Germany, 1945-49, and Director of the Office of German Political Affairs in the State Department from 1949 until he left the government in 1953. He has served as a research consultant and study director for the Council on Foreign Relations and is now engaged in public relations.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proceed on the assumption that we have continued to maintain troops in Germany solely because we think the Russians "are yearning to attack and occupy Western Europe, and that this is the principal danger." This seems to me to misread our purposes in having troops in Europe, at least since the immediate post-Korean period. Our troops are there to make local incursions unprofitable. They are there to discourage any Soviet propensity for following up to their own advantage local outbreaks, whether accidental or planned. They are there to bolster the self-confidence of Europe's democrats and to remove part of the weight of internal pressure by aggressive Communist parties and external pressures by Russia.

To say this is not in any sense to disagree with Mr. Kennan's observation that the Europeans have grown too accustomed to swimming with our waterwings. But one may be permitted to doubt whether his suggestion of a territorial-militia as an alternative to conventional and atom-age troops would be a satisfactory substitute. In November, 1956, when the security afforded by the presence of our atom-age troops was to all intents and purposes momentarily withdrawn by our break with Britain and France over Suez, the Russians did not lose a moment in wielding the threat of long-range missiles. Even possession of conventional troops by Britain and France did not enable them to dismiss the threats. Would militia have served them better?

I DO not mean to convey the impression that I think Mr. Kennan is consistently off-base. Far from it. His lectures constitute one of the most fruitful tours of the foreign policy horizon undertaken in many a day. It is unfortunate therefore, as it was perhaps inevitable, that most discussion has centered on the questionable reference to a possible mutual withdrawal of forces by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union, from Germany, perhaps even from Europe. This possibility has repeatedly raised itself in Mr. Kennan's mind in one form or another over a period of years, as Mr. Acheson pointed out. It does not gain in acceptability with the passage of time.

Whatever else we may suggest about Germany, equal and mutual Soviet-Western military withdrawal seems to me now as always to be unthinkable because it disturbs *to our disadvantage* whatever precarious security equilibrium now exists. Take a look at a map. Germany is not in Eastern Europe, scarcely even in Central Europe; it is in large part in Western Europe. I once heard Mr. Acheson exclaim, in an honest moment of exasperation as Secretary of State: "We really ought to just tell the Russians to get out of Europe period! They don't belong in Western and Central Europe. We shouldn't have to offer them anything to get out." Still, the fact is that today the Russians stand in the Thuringian Forest, 250 miles from the North Sea at The Hague or Flushing, 350 miles from Paris, 450 miles from London—and 1,200 miles from Moscow. They are 150 miles from the French frontier and 650 miles from the Russian border. In Mecklenburg, they stand only 90 miles from the North Sea coast, but nearly 400 miles from Russian-occupied East Prussia, to go no further East.

I take these plain facts and place them alongside three assumptions. One is that we are in Europe for more reasons than to guard against an all-out Russian attack of conquest. Another is that France and the Low Countries, plus other peripheral NATO territory, form an insufficient base for successful large-scale military operations against the USSR and our withdrawal to them would mean in fact that we would probably withdraw altogether from the continent and that NATO would fall apart as a defensive military organization. The third assumption is that a non-atomic Soviet incursion into Europe *in the absence of our troops* would not automatically draw in the US. From these facts and assumptions I conclude that an equal withdrawal would have very unequal results and would leave us and free Europe relatively weaker by far than we are now.

Mr. Kennan suggests that there is no inherent reason for not enforcing a kind of neutralism on a united Germany from which all foreign troops have withdrawn. I quite agree that a price has to be paid for a settlement and that part of that price may have to be restraints on Germany's military freedom. But I do not believe that Germany's enforced withdrawal from NATO is a price we can afford to pay. Ever since Blucher's rather tardy arrival on the field of Waterloo, Germany has steadily drifted away from Western Europe. This deplorable trend which culminated in two world wars has been miraculously reversed since the second of those wars. Germany is now by inclination and by interest as solidly entrenched in the Western European-Atlantic world as any power in it. Shall this be lightly thrown away or forbidden, even in the military sector? I say with more conviction than originality that a bird in the hand is still worth two in the bush. Short of a significant transformation of the scene, either by a change in Russian intentions or a change in Russian military capabilities (downward, relative to ours), do we not wish and need Germany's strength and energies to be harnessed in freedom and equality to those of other free nations?

But if the idea of German neutralism is, in my view, a dangerous venture in the wrong direction, there are other possibilities for discussion and possibly for eventual proposal to the Soviet Union. For example:

► Why not open the door to discussions on German unity between the two Germanies directly? This has always been strictly taboo. Originally we feared that the West Germans would come out second best or be weaned away from us. Surely they have earned the right to our confidence by now. Konrad Adenauer is probably less likely than anyone else in Europe to be tricked or cozened

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the Communists. Another past reason for refusing to consider such talks has been unwillingness to "recognize" the legitimacy of the East German regime. But there have been economic and other talks at various levels, without any imputation of backtracking from the position that Ulbricht, Grotewohl and their crowd are anything but murderers and imposters. Talks recognize only *de facto* power, not legitimacy. If there should be no other road to unification, illegality cannot be allowed to stand in the way. This is a matter for the Germans to decide, of course. But withdrawal of our well-known, firm and long-standing veto would help.

► Why not propose a demilitarized, denuclearized zone in Europe? What is called the Rapacki Plan, after the Polish Foreign Minister, proposes a zone free of all nuclear weapons and their manufacture, to include both Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This is much too broad. As proposed by Poland, it may be directed in the first instance against Germany, and more subtly, against Russia. As espoused by the Soviet Union, it is really aimed at weakening the United States and NATO or removing them altogether from the balance of power in Europe. But we do not need to be so ineffectual as merely to reject the Rapacki proposal out of hand without offering a counterproposal. Why not suggest that in a reunited Germany there be no atomic weapons, no troops of any kind, German or foreign, no bases and no military installations east of some line drawn roughly from Rostock through Magdeburg, Halle, Bayreuth and Munich? On the other hand, include in a similarly demilitarized and denuclearized zone those areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia lying west of a line running roughly from Danzig through Bromberg, Kattowicz, and Bratislava. A free capital, Berlin, and a Communist capital, Prague, would lie in the open zone.

This proposal retains whatever virtue exists in the Rapacki Plan by creating a zone of nuclear "disengagement"; in fact it goes a step further and creates a zone of total disengagement. It also calls for a unified Germany in which neither NATO nor West Germany would rush in to fill the military vacuum created by Russian withdrawal from East Germany. It thus compensates for the loss incurred by the Soviet Union. It avoids the trap of leaving our troops deprived of nuclear weapons and facing much heavier Soviet conventional forces. It avoids the further trap implicit in the Soviet plan of getting us out of Germany altogether at a subsequent stage. Finally, this is a counterproposal well within the quite vague limits set by Rapacki when he invited counter-proposals for a concrete but limited first step.

► Why not propose a new grouping of states to control the carrying out of such an agreement for a demilitarized zone? And why not let such a group be composed of members from both camps and from neither, without disturbing membership in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact? I would include united Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, together with Sweden and Austria as neutrals. These states, formed into a Council under a Mid-Europe Pact, could supervise and execute measures of inspection and control in the agreed zone. Were the eastern line to be shifted eastward so as to include bits of Hungary and Yugoslavia, as it well might, these states could also be represented. Here would be a possible bridge between the two camps, paradoxically joining them together in a compact whose sole purpose would be the peaceful separation of the NATO and Warsaw groups. Russia would retain influence. So would we. But power in the form of troops would be removed.

► Why not offer new security guarantees to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in connection with a German settlement? Mr. Dulles says we have already given a guarantee in the United Nations Charter. Quite so. But it is a fact of political life that every engagement requires a periodic renewal of pledges. Especially is this so where confidence is lacking. So if by some chance the Soviet Union should really feel any safer by reason of a new non-aggression pledge, why not give it? Let there be a corporate NATO guarantee as well as individual guarantees. And if it be said that we cannot do this because it amounts to a promise on our part of a hands-off policy to the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, so be it. Let's face up to it: are we or are we not going to start a war for the "liberation" of those countries? My guess is that no responsible American will say that we are. Then why not a security pledge every week if that would help achieve the unification of Germany or lessen tension?

To sum up, I think we should take a position which would say something like the following to the Russians: The reunification of Germany is right and it is inevitable. But we stand on the principle that it be done in a way freely acceptable to the majority of the Germans. Moreover, while we are willing to take risks, you must take equal risks. We will not accept "solutions" all in your favor any more than you will accept the reverse. We are not prepared to withdraw from Europe politically or economically. We are not even prepared to withdraw militarily except at a price to you which assures us that we will have at least no more to fear from you than at present. Withdrawal of troops an equal distance on both sides is unacceptable because geography is already in your favor and would then be more so.

This leads me to observe that it is not our moral or political duty to find an answer for Germany that will "please" the Russians. They are protecting what they conceive to be their interests, as we must protect ours. Our only duty is diligently to seek a German solution that will preserve our relative security, prevent a German relapse, and contribute to a less dangerous relationship with the Soviet Union. Let the Russians say no for a change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Refugees — Still the Paper Chase

A ONE-TIME Hungarian flying officer named Zoltan Szantos showed up with his family at the US Embassy here the other day with the expectations of leaving shortly for the United States. Within an hour after he arrived, having been called to Vienna at American request, he found to his shock and utter dejection that the United States wasn't having him.

Szantos was, at the least, completely deserving: on the Communist blacklist for 10 years because of his wartime service, victim of the ill-fated Dominican resettlement experiment last year, possessor of papers showing a job and his wife's brother waiting for him in Santa Rosa, California. Not being advised differently, he had taken two of his daughters out of refugee boarding schools, a third daughter out of a hospital and had reported, family, baggage and all, to the huge American consulate building behind Vienna's Rathaus for what he thought would be the processing that would start him off to America.

But after three questions, the interviewer closed Szantos' folder, said his entry was not possible, that he and his family did not qualify. Why it was not possible Szantos still does not know. He thinks it has something to do with the fact that he had been a member of the group of 580 Hungarians who had been promised land and jobs in the Dominican Republic, but instead had found fever, jungle and Trujillian brutality, after which most of them had been returned to Austria.

The US Immigration and Naturalization Service representatives in Vienna say otherwise. One official, after a half-hour of wordy double-talk, finally claimed that the Dominican migration did not enter into the Szantos case, but that he had been rejected under the American "close-relative" rule—the thin black line down which American immigration authorities here now tread. They are allowed to admit certain deserving Hungarians but, at the same time, apparently, are afraid to create any sort of stir that might displease Rep. Francis Walters.

Szantos had been "deferred" (no-one ever is "rejected") because he had not seen his brother-in-law in 10 years; his entry into the US "would not effect the reunion of a family unit," it was said by the officials.

Such is the mad world in which the 19,118 Hungarians remaining in Austria now live: hope one day, joy, another, despair the next. The mass migrations long since have ended. Requirements, especially to the US, have become more stringent: the slightest blemish on an applicant's record can disqualify him. What now moves from place to place are not the refugees, but their dossiers—from Austrian government to sponsoring agency to the United Nations High Commissioner's Office, to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to the United States Escapee Program to the US Embassy, perhaps, and then back around again. "The Great Paper Chase" someone here called it the other day—a cycle of file-passing.

Not all of the paper-shuffling is without function. ICEM, for instance, which deals quite efficiently with refugee logistics, is IBM-carding every one of the remaining Hungarian refugees in Austria. As of the middle of December, 15,198 Hungarians had been classified as to skill, number of dependents, background and health. When the registration has been finished ICEM will be able to locate a refugee with a needed skill quickly and move him into the taker country with a minimum of red tape.

Meantime, the refugees are living lives that cannot be IBM-carded. Most families are broken up, one or more of the adults living in a camp, the children in boarding schools or in private homes. They make fantastic treks to see each other. A man in a camp near Salzburg travels 400 miles each weekend to see his wife who cooks for an American family in Vienna. Their children are in a school in Lower Austria. He has no job; she has the only income in the family. They are more fortunate than some. The ICEM has registered 1,898 refugees who are termed "hard-core"; too old, too sick or, for some other reason unable to work and, in most cases, impossible to place. Even those refugees who have skills do not easily find jobs. Although the Austrian economy, at present, is quite firm, it still cannot absorb much outside labor.

ALSO problematical is the future of 1,400 or more Hungarian refugee children, many of whom are unaccompanied. The Austrian Interior Ministry, which nominally is responsible for them, has done little to channel their energies into non-rebellious pursuits. At a camp at Neuhaus, 20 teenagers ganged up on a police guard and threatened to throw him from an upper story window after they had beaten him for "snooping." At the Queen Juliana School, sponsored by a Dutch foundation, 200 teenagers went on a hunger strike and demanded, among other things, the removal of the school director, a Hungarian refugee priest whom they accused of immoral conduct with one of the teachers and improper advances to several of the older girls. The Dutch commission, which investigated, discharged the director. But the removal came after the *fait accompli* since he had disappeared from the grounds after an irate teenager threatened to kill him.

Meanwhile the paper chase continues; and the Hungarians are being joined by an influx of Yugoslavs (officially put at 16,618 during 1957) and a number of Czechs who have managed to cross into Austria during the past few months.

MARTIN LURAY

Vienna

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

The Decline of France

by Percy Winner

THE BOMBING of Sakiet Sidi Youssef may cost the French more than the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The generals of the French army in Algeria and Resident General Lacoste notwithstanding, the gay and insouciant Felix Gaillard cannot escape credit for the inglorious victory over unarmed civilians in a Tunisian border town. In purse and at heart the Boy Wonder of High Finance is a man of the political Right whose role in the grotesque parody of Algerian Pacification lends point to Charles de Gaulle's diagnostic of France's current ills: "There's nothing to be done: the Left is against the State, the Right is against the Nation."

The French Nation, From Napoleon to Petain, 1814-1940, by D. W. Brogan (Harper; $4.50).

Books continue to be written about what's wrong with France and the French, some of them good books—Luthy, Williams, White, Schoenbrun. But none digs a scalpel so surely into the canker of French politics as de Gaulle's simple statement; and few explain better than Brogan's *The French Nation* what the statement means. The brilliant Scottish professor's tour of the horizon from Napoleon to Petain is neither history in an academic sense nor popularization on the intellectual level of what are now called the media of mass communication. In substance and in style it ranges the heights and assumes that you have come prepared; but if you approach it as a work of the writing thinker's art, if you bring to it your own thought, feeling and a bit of effort besides, it is pure joy. You see the glory and grandeur of France, the measure and proportion of the French yielding to that most rare and least forgiveable of French vices, stupidity. But at the end, the mood it generates is not the viewing with alarm or the moral indignation of the reformer; it is the resigned willingness of the philosopher to be neither disappointed nor surprised that a state (which, in the cliché of Mauras and Daudet, was made by 40 kings over a thousand years) should have abdicated authority, evaded decision, organized political life to penalize and prevent greatness.

BROGAN is writing about the end of the Third Republic when he says that

> . . . A people which, in one hundred and fifty years, had astonished the world in every field of achievement, which had known every form of glory, in war, in sanctity, in all the arts and sciences, had yet failed to find institutions that united the French people and gave them a political way of life worthy of their genius, their courage, their legitimate hopes.

During that century and a half France has had nearly a dozen different forms of the state, not quite as many to be sure as governments under the dozen or so years of the French Republic, but enough to suggest why the winner of this year's Goncourt talks of the Portugalization of France and why some honest republicans fear that a French Franco may come from Algeria to Petainize the Elysée. The state often has been weak: Brogan says the July monarchy began as a device and ended as a dodge. More often governments have been corrupted by money or power; violation of the will of the electorate became under the Third Republic a habit which has, under the Fourth, become a tradition: Brogan points out that Left majorities in 1924, 1932, 1936 uniformly resulted in Right-of-Center governments in 1926, 1934, 1938. And who will say that *le petit Felix* represents *le peuple* (with or without capital letters?) The people have been contemned or disregarded; or they have been adulated as what Brogan calls "the new St. Augustine," destined for a task to which History called them. They have, rather more rarely, been part of or close to truly democratic process. But never before have they, as now, been party—by support or consent—to acts of their government which so obscenely caricature the virtues of *la doulce France.* In Algeria the victims of Hitler have let men who profess to be of the Left copy Hitler in using the Big Lie as a tactic and torture as a practice; the sons of those Frenchmen of the classical Right who once mocked Mussolini now more than condone the use of his methods.

Next Week

Leonardo da Vinci

An essay

by Paul Valery

translated by Malcolm Cowley

IN THE FIRST decades after the French Revolution all classes, except the nobility, seemed in retrospect to think that it had been a good thing; but the time came, especially in the decade before Petain, when many Frenchmen looked back upon the Revolution as a remediable tragedy. Ridicule kills in France, as Brogan says, but all the contempt for business and finance of generations of French intellectuals has periodically put in the places of political powers such representatives of "the high bank"—originally the families of the 200 biggest shareholders in the Banque de France—as Monsieur Gaillard, *Inspecteur des Finances,* and incidentally a very rich young man himself.

How well Brogan writes! Of the Chinese complacency of so many Parisians; of Morny, doubly a bastard of illustriousstock, first of the great lobbyists of the beet-sugar trust (against which Mendès-France fought and lost) who was "equally at home, on the battlefield, on the Bourse, or in the boudoir"; of the life of the Third Republic (and *ad forteriori,* of the Fourth):

> . . . marked by a grave distrust of leadership; by the assertion, by the Chamber of Deputies, of a detailed and incessant control of executive action as well as policy; and by the failure to develop an adequately organized party

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system that would translate the popular will into a coherent program and a unified execution of it.

Why have the French betrayed their traditional moral, humane, intellectual values; why have they stumbled into an indifference which is not even cynical? For one thing, they have been badly schooled in the values of modern materialism. By a fault in the organization of higher education, Brogan shows, the *Ecole Normale* and its pupils were cut off from a close study of the classical economists. The feebleness of French economic teaching has been one of the reasons for the relative success of Marxism in its Communist form. Another reason was (and is) "the lack of respect for crude and inconvenient fact." French cultural traditions pleaded for "complete, absolute solutions. For generations it was the hallmark of the enlightened man to despise the bourgeois." On the other hand, the French workers were "divided, ill-disciplined, bemused by the idea of 'Revolution', with a capital letter . . . sharing in the backwardness, in the current technical world, of French bourgeois society, incurably petty bourgeois in many of their tastes."

AFTER reading *The French Nation* it is not hard to understand some of the reasons why Gaillard won a resounding vote of confidence in the National Assembly on the issue of the Tunisian bombing, despite the revulsion of world opinion. Simply, the Assembly does not represent the people. Unfortunately, that it not the end of the story. The people no longer are for either the state or the nation, and certainly do not continue the great traditions of the past. The bitterness about 1940 and what followed was worsened by the later losses, especially Indo-China. Pride was wounded, deeply, nastily. No poll can tell the truth, but it is probable that most Frenchmen supported the Suez adventure; and when that went so tragically wrong, the mood was prepared for the *ultras* in North Africa. Rather than eat any more humble pie, they would defy the warnings of Mendès-France and in Algeria try to have the cake and eat it at the same time, whether or not their teeth were broken. Of course, there are minorities; there are still intelligent Frenchmen, also rather fewer Frenchmen willing to take risks, to suffer rather than countenance cruelty, callousness, above all *bêtise*.

Writing about a French military doctrine, during World War I, Brogan says:

> It was, in the worst sense of the term, a very French doctrine, rhetorical, verbal, above serious consideration of material conditions and possibilities.

But what is happening in Algeria is worse—above consideration of the human and moral values without which France is not truly France, lacking the lucid intelligence without which *le peuple* (without a capital) might as well have a Salazar, or very much worse.

INTERNATIONAL LADIES'
GARMENT WORKERS' UNION
David Dubinsky, President

MEMO TO: Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor
The New Republic

From: Gus Tyler, Director
ILGWU Training Institute

Subject: A DIFFERENT KIND OF JOB OPPORTUNITY

It occurs to me that the kind of young men and women who read your magazine would be actively interested in a job—and a challenge—that others of their generation have accepted and turned into a rewarding way of life.

The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union conducts its own "West Point," to perpare young men and women for careers in labor leadership. The one-year course combines classroom and field work. Those who complete the course are assigned to a full time job with the union.

With the job comes the challenge--to provide the kind of dedicated and ethical leadership that will make the American labor movement the creative social force it seeks to be.

The Training Institute is now in its eighth year. 108 of its graduates now hold union office in the ILGWU. Virtually all started as organizers --to learn the labor movement at the grass roots. While some continue at this mission as their first and enduring love, others branch out to take on responsibilities as business agents, local union managers, educational and political directors, area supervisors, time study experts, etc.

There is nothing soft or cushy about any of these jobs. But then we are not looking for young people who want the easy plush life. We want those who will enjoy the sting of challenge in the three-dimensional world of flesh and blood people confronted with raw existence.

To these, we open the doors of the Institute. Write before April 15: ILGWU Training Institute, 1710 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Macdonald's Guide to Impractical Politics

by Ian Watt

How old-fashioned it sounds, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist:* a whole lifetime of fateful struggle in Swiss cafes and Siberian prisons finally mummified in the prosings of self-important anecdote. A misleading title, to be sure, for this lively book: "memoir" hardly applies to anything but Macdonald's first essay, a dashing retrospect of his political career written for *Encounter* last spring; and in it we learn that he was only a certified revolutionist—a member of the Trotskyite party—for some two years (1939-1941). From the wisdom of his 51 years Macdonald regards his former active involvement in more or less radical politics as "absurd and slightly insane"; and with this book of collected pieces he is now bidding his earlier self farewell.

Memoirs of a Revolutionist: Essays in Political Criticism, by Dwight Macdonald (Farrar, Straus & Cudahy; $4.75).

In many ways this is a great pity. For, as an independent journalist of pacifist and anarchist leanings, especially in the years from 1944 to 1949 when he was "editor, publisher, owner, proofreader, layout man and chief contributor" of *Politics,* he was a uniquely vigilant and comprehensive critic of our political life. As the vitality of the present collection shows: how much other political journalism is worth reprinting ten years later?

The most impressive single group of articles is that on "The Responsibility of Peoples," where Macdonald protests against the prevalent war-time attitude that the German people as a whole were responsible both for the war and the death-camps, and that therefore the Allies were justified in pressing for an unconditional surrender and a punitive peace. Macdonald's polemic was based on three main positions: that such actions as the air bombings which killed half a million civilians deprived us of any moral advantage we might originally have had; further, that ruthless measures were in fact unwise because they prevented popular democratic revolts in enemy countries during and after the war; and finally, that in any case the individual cannot logically be held responsible for the deeds into which he is coerced by the monolithic agencies of the modern state.

As to Macdonald's basic premise—the denial of individual moral responsibility under modern political conditions—it is certainly difficult if not impossible to refute. Yet the argument seems to me to be dangerously two-edged: after all, it was the first modern dictator, Napoleon, who remarked that no one is responsible for collective crimes. In any case I think that if you do adopt the theoretical position that there is an absolute discontinuity between the individual and the collectivity, you thereby so completely deny the basis of all existing political arrangements that you at once forfeit any claim to be considered as a responsible advocate in the realm of practical political policies.

Insofar as Macdonald made such a claim I think he was illogical and misleading: but I labor the point here only because I doubt whether it is possible to understand the original, enduring, and often infuriating, character of Macdonald's writings until one has realized that he never really accepted the rather stringent limitations of perspective which are the pre-condition of all practical political action.

Consider his statement that

> . . . The shallowness of the New Deal and the British Labour Party's post-war regime is shown by their failure to improve any of the important things in people's lives—the actual relationships on the job, the way they spend their leisure, and child-rearing and sex and art.

Two chicks in every bed? Every man a Michelangelo? Surely by any reasonable standard of comparison the two governments in question have done more to change human life for the better than any other? Some political writers, no doubt, beginning with Plato, may have talked as though the very nature of human life could be utterly transformed. But I find it difficult to believe that any-

RUSSIAN LIBERALISM

FROM GENTRY TO INTELLIGENTSIA

By GEORGE FISCHER. Was there ever a chance of a Western type of free society in Russia? In this important book Mr. Fischer traces the plight of the liberal in Russian society from the Great Reforms to the 1905 Revolution. He points out the attempts at reform made by Russian liberals, why these attempts failed and the light that Russian liberalism throws on the dilemma of many underdeveloped societies today. $4.50

DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By MARK G. FIELD, with an introduction by Paul Dudley White. This remarkably informed work moves from a discussion of the history and development of medical care in the Soviet Union to the physician and his social role and finally to the patient. We see how the actions of the Ministry of Health and of the individual physicans are strictly controlled by the Party and how the emphasis on production in Soviet society even changes the standards by which one is considered sick or well. Chapters on the patient draw on over 1600 written questionnaires. $5.00

SOVIET TRANSPORTATION POLICY

By HOLLAND HUNTER. Those interested in the development of Russia as an industrial power will find this book unusually revealing. It is well-known that most nations in their developing stages place great emphasis on expansion of transportation facilities. Russia, with apparent success, is an exception to this rule, however, and Mr. Hunter has written a thoroughly documented analysis of the wisdom of the Russian policy from the middle 1920's to the present day. $8.50

Through your bookseller, or from,

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 Garden Street
Cambridge 38, Mass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one who has looked at history or his fellowmen or even at himself, can ever really have believed it. I am not sure that Macdonald ever did completely; but I don't think there's any doubt that some half-formulated expectation of the millenium initiated the political portion of his career.

INEVITABLY, of course, such exacting and unrealizable hopes led him fairly quickly to a bitter rejection, first of all existent political movements, and later of all practical political activity. But, and this is the essential point, his intransigent idealism provided an excellent perspective for the writing of political criticism. On the one hand Macdonald's absolutist criteria made him quite independent of any current political line: he never had to refrain from saying things because they would offend his friends; nor was he ever led to withhold the seamier side of the news during the war as other editors did out of some notion of fostering patriotic morale. At the same time the fact that he approached politics with a much wider set of operative interests than those of the professional publicists and political scientists more than compensated for the unrealistic nature of some of his assumptions. After all, if most of the professional poly-sciolists were to be judged by the practical effectiveness of their writings, most of them might just as well be deciphering the records of the Hittite kingdoms; their actual function, surely, is either to be morticians of the present (embalming by statistics) or soothsayers of the future (desperately attuning their hearing-aids to the voice of tomorrow but only hearing today's—and their own).

Macdonald's fearsomely absolute procedures also, of course, do much to account for the infuriating quality of his polemic: inevitably, his judgments on anyone who concentrates on attainable political results are palpably unjust. This is especially true of those with professed aims akin to his own; witness the unfair but devastating book on Wallace, or the endless baiting of the liberal weeklies. If your basic presuppositions make you deaf to the truism that all effective political action involves both endless tactical compromise and a use of propaganda which must often fall short of the whole truth, you naturally present all New Dealers and "totalitarian liberals" as if they were quite gratuitously engaged in the betrayal of their principles to further an unscrupulous lust for power.

Memoirs of a Revolutionist makes clear, I think, the singular consistency of Macdonald's development. As a schoolboy at Phillips Exeter Academy he founded a club called "The Hedonists" whose slogans were "Cynicism, Aestheticism, Criticism, Pessimism."

This spirit has never weakened, and its expression has always been stimulated by a notable unreluctance to offend and a disarming refusal to be daunted by his own limitations. At Yale, for example, he wrote an editorial "asking the venerable William Lyon Phelps, who had undertaken a new course in Shakespeare, if he honestly thought he was competent to give it." Exactly the same note of attractive impudence informs his later negations: the United Nations, "is, quite simply, a bore"; as for religion, well, "it moves me even more than Marxism."

Macdonald's political career, I think, must in part be understood as an expression of the same rather Ninety-ish impatience with the present order of things. Before he turned to politics in 1937 he had been notably uninterested in public affairs; but his work on *Fortune* magazine happened to bring him into close touch with American capitalism, and then, as he writes, revealingly:

> . . . my undergraduate suspicions were confirmed—the men running our capitalist system were narrow, uncultivated and commonplace . . . and they could have been replaced as our ruling class without any damage to our culture by an equal number of citizens picked at random from the phone book.

His "natural bent," as he confesses, has always been "towards individualism, empiricism, moralism, aestheticism"; and it could only be a matter of time before he turned from politics to "the kind of social-cultural reportage and analysis that interests me more than political writing." In this wider field, the great range of his interests, his intellectual and moral vigor, and his remarkable talents as a journalist, have found freer expression.

THERE have, no doubt, been some concessions. In some of his work as a staff writer for *The New Yorker*, in the profile of Dorothy Day, for example, which is reprinted here, one finds traces of that journal's flip lack of commitment; the profile is by definition an incomplete and two-dimensional mode of portraiture. Yet the profiles on the Ford Foundation make fascinating reading, and at least save us from being at the mercy of hearsay, official platitudes, or Congressman Carroll Reece. In general, one often regrets in Macdonald's writing the journalistic tendency to turn everything into rather more of a story than it really is; but one must also recognize that his status as a successful journalist is a necessary condition of the range and variety of his commentary, since it saves him from the restriction of attitude and experience which being a coterie writer involves.

HIS capacity to tackle anything seems to me phenomenal. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread, no doubt; but Macdonald's resolute independence makes him a kind of Holy Fool; his *sancta simplicitas*, like Orwell's, often pierces through to patent but important truths on which the specialists have been silent, presumably because their fastidiousness is affronted by the obvious. Macdonald's recent article on *By Love Possessed* in the January *Commentary* is a case in point; one wouldn't go to it for a nicely discriminated judgment on Cozzens; but where else could one find so rich a combination of critical power, cultural awareness, and cantankerous hilarity?

In most of his differences with his radical contemporaries the course of history seems to have endorsed his unfailingly pessimistic prognoses; and in that sense the sadness of contemporary history has been indispensable in making possible the rare spectacle of a man who is permanently wedded to taking the gloomy view, and yet who lives himself out with exhilarating gusto because he has at least found a vocation that richly serves both his needs and those of the time.

Macdonald is one expert detector of Emperors who have no clothes. I wouldn't deny that his dedicated zeal sometimes leads him to twich off the last few vestments himself; but I salute his verve, and I think I know why the unremitting pessimism of his report never seems to damp his ardor—his own keen scent and the abundance of game guarantee him full employment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ART

"Art News" Sees a Conspiracy

THE ART SEASON now at its half way point has been marked by two important revivals of interest in earlier 20th Century work. One, flourishing mainly at a number of New York dealers, brought to our attention the too long neglected achievement of the "ash can" painters— this is the 50th anniversary of the Eight's group show. What happened to the Eight is one of the profound ironies of art history. Having struck an immensely successful blow for art freedom, several of them went in for art revolution on a wholesale basis. They set up the Armory show within five years of their own victory and in so doing laid the foundations for a hyphenated American art that more or less completely bypassed the Eight.

The second revival of the year is, of course, the Germans. The scope is bigger. The series of dealers' shows that began last fall is still going on, with new openings announced regularly. Along the East coast there have been museum shows from Boston to Carolina. The keystone of the revival was the large and instructive "German Art of the Twentieth Century," assembled by Andrew Carnduff Ritchie as his swan song at the Museum of Modern Art before he left for Yale. The show is now in St. Louis where an extra three dozen works were added from local collections. In two weeks the show will close, but it seems likely already that its effects will last for a long time.

Like the Americans, the Germans were more or less submerged by French painting in their own time and since. The Museum of Modern Art has done a great service in bringing a substantial body of work once more to the light of day. The popularity of the newly-seen painting, sculpture and printmaking is best measured by the reaction of *Art News*. Its editor, Dr. Alfred Frankfurter, wrote a signed editorial asserting (a) that no matter how things may look at the moment, the center of the century's painting is French, I tell you, French, and (b) that the whole new interest in the Germans stems from dealers' activities. The second proposition contains the implication that there is some other means by which artist and audience get together; that the French, for example, and the magazine's own American abstract expressionists were brought by the stork.

MORE interesting than these assertions is the single reasoned statement in Dr. Frankfurter's attack—or counterattack, as he seems to regard it. The art in question was "not only provincial but so intellectual that it usually stayed far beyond the proper limits of painting as such." There are those, and surely Dr. Frankfurter's readers through the years must be among them, who still believe that the reason the academy was burned down was precisely to destroy the notion of proper limits to painting. Apparently in the new freedom that *Art News* has consistently championed, some of us are more free than others and among those who are less free are the Germans. Their crime is not only being intellectual, but being concerned with "everything from metaphysics and pathology to Marxism and social agonies," and, the unforgivable sin, "attempting in paint what should be said in words."

Well, no. There are many paintings in the German show that say, among other things, what can be said in words or even what has been said in words. There is none that could be fully translated into a paragraph or even a sonnet.

Dix, for example, is saying that war is hell, but the simple statement is far from rendering the reality of the soul in hell in Dix's etching of the wounded soldier.

Marc might conceivably be saying, Be kind to your four legged friends. But no statement of the innocence and beauty of animals could make its point in the same way the painter does in his "Blue Horses," in the deer pictures and above all in the overwhelming "Tyrol," which, without a discernible animal form conveys the tears of nature as the forest dream is shattered.

And what is Kokoschka saying? That the world is very wide? Actually, his panoramic sweep of London Bridge and the Thames does say that. As in his great picture of the port of Hamburg, Kokoschka even suggests the curvature of the earth, but the painting is no map. It is the exaltation of the human spirit confronted with the wideness of the world.

Exaltation of the spirit is characteristic, sometimes in a joyous, sometimes in a tragic mode. One thing is never found in the paintings, the sculpture or the prints, and that is complete self-sufficiency. Its absence, I think, is what caused the shock and dismay at *Art News*. For all the "expressionism" of German art, there is never a hint of the current American theory employing the same name and seriously convinced that sole relationship in art is the one between the artist and his materials as it exists during the act of expression. The Germans are concerned with the world in which they live and with the realities underlying that world.

The real indictment against the Germans is that they had something to say. This year's review of their work reveals that in dealing first with a society which they knew in their bones to be foul behind a fair façade and later with the ruins of that society as it lay in fragments around them, the Germans penetrated time and place to the unchanging condition of man on the earth.

You don't need a conspiracy of the dealers to explain the "boom," if there is one, in German art. A lot of people have been waiting a long time simply to be spoken to.

FRANK GETLEIN

EUROPE

Summer 1958—70 days

We'll see the usual, plus North Africa, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, and Denmark. A low priced, different kind of trip for the young in spirit who don't want to be herded around.

EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia (Box N)
Pasadena, Calif.

Notes on Contributors

PERCY WINNER is a veteran commentator on European affairs. IAN WATT is on the faculty of the University of California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MUSIC

Miss Glanville-Hicks Goes Simple

BY THE END of April, New York will have seen its first real "season" of American operas. The City Center, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, has scheduled productions of nine American operas, including three world premieres. Works by Barber, Beeson, Bernstein, Floyd, Taylor and Menotti have already been performed under various auspices. And the newest addition to the list—*The Transposed Heads*, by Peggy Glanville-Hicks—was introduced at the Phoenix Theatre on February 10. This event was not, technically, a world premiere; Miss Glanville-Hicks had written the work for the Louisville Philharmonic, and the opera is already out on records. Nonetheless, the first New York staging was a grand affair.

The libretto, drawn from a minor work of Thomas Mann, is a model of elegance. Mann's novella is based on an old Hindu tale about a young husband and his friend who, in a fit of zeal, behead themselves as a sacrifice to the goddess of destruction. When the wife discovers the bodies and attempts suicide herself, the goddess genially offers to wipe out the sacrifice and bring the two men back to life. However, the wife (a novice at the art of resurrecting the dead), nervously attaches the right heads to the wrong bodies. When the men come back to life in this form, there is some confusion about who is married to whom. As a "just solution" to their problem, the men kill each other and the wife becomes a suttee on their funeral pyre.

In preparing the work for the stage, Miss Glanville-Hicks (who patched the libretto together herself, using scraps of the book) has got rid of all the traditional encumbrances of grand opera, so that the plot unfolds quickly and simply. This is an opera in which nothing gets in the way—even the scene changes are over in a few seconds—so that, with one intermission break, it takes just less than two hours to perform.

The texture of the music is so light as to be insubstantial. Two things are emphasized: melody and rhythm. The singers bear the burden of the melody, but it must be an easy burden, as Miss Glanville-Hicks has gone to great pains to flatter the singers and make them comfortable. In keeping with the text, the composer has made a serious effort to introduce Hindu materials into her score, and in the synthesis she achieves a startlingly fake-Oriental tone, but aside from this false note, her materials suggest an artless spontaneity. There are no fully-developed arias in the conventional sense, but there are dozens of exquisite tunes, most of them less than a minute long which, once they have been sung, are expertly woven into the fabric of the work.

The conventional instruments of the orchestra are given minor jobs; it is the percussion section (heavily augmented) that gives the music its sonority and rhythmic drive. The contraptions employed vary from great gongs to high-pitched, barely audible bells; and they produce a most lustrous sound. The orchestra is used not only to enhance the activity on-stage, but to provide an ironic commentary on the proceedings—at the end, for instance, the orchestra strikes up an exhilerating rhumba as an accompaniment to the cremation of the principals. The prevailing mood of the piece is cheerful, relaxed, and uncomplicated.

This simplicity is not as ingenuous as it may seem. Miss Glanville-Hicks evidently believes that she has come across a principle of composition that may revolutionize Western music. Describing her present method of working, she recently wrote that

> . . . A distrust of composition "systems" precipitated some years ago a searching re-examination of music's first principles . . . and a conviction grew that melody and rhythm are our basic, perennial expressive and structural factors; that in harmony, the vertical concept, we have come to an impasse. Accordingly, I threw out harmony . . .

This is strong language. But Peggy Glanville-Hicks has earned the right to use it, even if her theories turn out to be wrong. Throughout her career, Miss Glanville-Hicks has been in the vanguard of musical fashion. In the past, there has been an impermanence about her convictions; ten years ago, for instance, she was effectively championing the highly dissonant and volatile "advanced" styles that most listeners found—and find—unbearably ugly. She mastered those styles completely, and if she now wishes to turn her back on them, her choice is based on experience.

NONETHELESS, I feel that she has miscalculated the nature and importance of what she has accomplished in *The Transposed Heads*. True, the piece is one of the richest outpourings of unencumbered melody in recent years. But her claim that she "threw out harmony" won't bear scrutiny. She thinned it and she slowed it down, but she didn't throw it out.

While "originality" may be an overvalued quality, it is the quality that Miss Glanville-Hicks has developed, and the results have been most distinguished. Her opera is the only new one I have seen recently that is likely to have any large or long-term significance.

ROBERT EVETT

do you know

THE FACTS OF LIFE

about cancer?

It's time you did! Last year cancer claimed the lives of 250,000 Americans; 75,000 of them lost their lives *needlessly* because they didn't know the facts of life about cancer. 800,000 Americans are alive today . . . cured of cancer . . . because they went to their doctors *in time*. They knew that a health checkup once a year is the best insurance against cancer. Make an appointment right now for a checkup . . . and make it a habit *for life*.

AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

not supposed to have such violent reactions, but "Who Will Teach the Teachers?" by David Stevenson (*NR*, January 13) did it! This "cotton picker" is insulting me!

Perhaps I am in that wrong half that "ought not to have been graduated from high school and, furthermore, learned practically nothing during four years of college"; or worse perhaps I am described by "any student who had intellectual pretensions was a lost sheep at Murray State College and stayed only because of the pinch of poverty. Most of the school's crudities can be laid at the door of its dingy determination to compete wth other schools by being the cheapest college in a 100-mile radius: its graduates could scarcely pass as educated people, even by teachers' college standards. . . ."

I guess the second quotation fits me better than the first since I did pretty well on my college entrance placement tests. As to the second, the man is starting right, anyway. It was the "pinch of poverty" that made me select Murray State. . . .

I don't remember much about "fraternity, sorority, dormitory and organized cliques on the campus." Most of the students I knew at MSC didn't have much time for all that; they were mostly veterans or people working their way through school—or both. A surprisingly large number were married (as I was). . . .

I received my B.A. degree in January, 1951, with majors in mathematics and history (not education). I feel the instruction I received in both fields was far above that of the average college student in America. In 1952 I received my M.A. in mathematics (not education) at Peabody College, Nashville, Tennessee. I then taught high school math in a small, rural (Stevenson would probably prefer the word "bucolic") school in Alabama. I have never enjoyed any work more. Of course I had to get a part-time night job to get enough money to live on.

Half way through my second year of teaching the draft board "encouraged" me to accept a direct commission in the Air Force. The Air Force sent me to Penn State where I received a B.S. degree in meteorology. While at Penn State the Air Force students were required to take a mathematics review course covering everything from college algebra through advanced calculus in eight weeks. Of the 45 who started there were 10 passing by the end of the first week. During this week we had taken the Penn State finals in algebra, trigonometry, and plane and solid analytics. At this stage the class was split into a 10-man section and a 35-man section. I finished in the top third of the 10-man section.

My good showing was not due to my being a Newton. It was because my math background was much better than that of most of the students; and these students were as random a sample as you could get—all were college graduates with majors in math, science or engineering, and many had masters degrees. The schools represented ranged from Harvard to Murray State (me). My relative standing was the result of exceptional instruction I received in my previous college work from "the demoralized and incompetent of the academic world."

Stevenson's department at MSC may have been lousy, I wouldn't know. But I can assure him that the history and mathematics departments are exceptional. . . .

I have not returned to teaching as a full-time job because I cannot afford it. Any time the salary is doubled I'm ready to go back to being one of the best math teachers in the business. Until that time I shall continue as an Air Force weather forecaster; it pays well and it is a fascinating career.

Stevenson's most dangerous statement is in his last paragraph. Tell that character to stop knocking teachers' pay. You will never get competent teachers in the schools and keep them there unless you pay decent salaries. He is right when he says "we need teachers," but he should have added "and we will have to pay for them."

BARNEY T. WATSON
1/Lt., USAF

Bedford, Mass.

► *Halsey vs. Nixon*

SIRS:

CONTRARY to what John Holt thinks about Margaret Halsey's article on Nixon, I am of the opinion that it should be printed in pamphlet form so every family in the land could read it.

O. C. HOLLISTER

Amite, Louisiana

The article is being reprinted and will be available in quantities shortly.—The Editors

AUTHORS WANTED BY N. Y. PUBLISHER

New York, N. Y.—One of the nation's largest book publishers is seeking manuscripts of all types—fiction, non-fiction, poetry. Special attention to new writers. If your work is ready for publication, send for booklet RP—*it's free.* Vantage Press, 120 W. 31st St., New York 1. (Midwest Office: 220 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago 4, Ill.)

Your Book Published!

Our famous plan has launched 700 authors. We edit, publish, advertise, distribute. Send manuscript for free report or write for Brochure NR. **PAGEANT PRESS, 101 5th AVE., NEW YORK 3**

Invitation

MANUFACTURERS TRUST CO., NYC
Around $44½ earned $4.06 in '57 or over 9 percent. Buy shares. Be a bank stockholder!
WHY?
Earning more profits, more safe. Growth possibilities excellent. Low price. A new period of bank prosperity.
BUY FROM THE BANK STOCK SPECIALIST!
Shares available, any amount, Maxwell May Co., Bank Stock Specialist, 17 East 55th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Phone Plaza 1-1663.
Bank Stocks are more profitable, more safe, and have more growth possibilities.

CONTRIBUTIONS INVITED for a new review, *The Fifties*. We pay for poems, and articles on poetry or politics. Subscription $2.00 per year. First issue in March. Briarwood Hill, Pine Island, Minnesota.

SEND YOUR OPINIONS to every Congressman every month. 88¢ per month. Details free. Poll-NR, 480 S. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill.

OLD BOOKS FOUND. CATALOGS issued. Our specialty, Spanish books, but we try to stock good books on all subjects. El Cascajero, the old Spanish book mine, 164 Lexington, New York 16.

BRITISH BOOK BARGAINS—ALL SUBJECTS. Catalogues free. Transbooks, Box 1—NR, Wantagh, New York.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money-back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

LEARN WHILE ASLEEP: Details free. Research Association, Box 610-NR, Omaha, Nebraska.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion)	12c
Per word 6 times in one contract year	11c
Per word 13 times in one contract year	10c
Per word 26 times in one contract year	9c
Per word 52 times in one contract year	8c

NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth St. N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Stanislaus Joyce's book is not only indispensable as a study of a great author by his brother, but it would be fascinating even if the brother were a complete unknown. Really, the talent in the Joyce family is almost incredible."—FRANK O'CONNOR

My Brother's Keeper

JAMES JOYCE'S EARLY YEARS

by his brother

STANISLAUS

In this salty, outspoken, affectionate portrait of his brother, Stanislaus Joyce has written a book of unique interest and high literary distinction. Every page crackles with his razor-sharp powers of observation, with his Irish gift for vituperation. Authoritative and explicit, this remarkable biography covers James Joyce's early years, the all-important Dublin years which were the wellsprings of everything he was to write. Stanislaus was the one person with both the ability and the closeness to Joyce to re-create this fascinating period, and to give us insights and personal data nowhere else available. *Illustrated* $5.00

Introduction and notes by RICHARD ELLMANN
Preface by T. S. ELIOT

THE VIKING PRESS

New York 22, N. Y.

POETS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Edited by W. H. Auden and Norman Holmes Pearson

The poetic riches of 600 years have been gathered together in these five remarkable volumes. Beautifully designed and bound durably in paper, they offer a magnificent survey of British and American poetry from Middle English to modern times.

"Beyond question the best and most useful anthology of English poetry ever made."—ALLEN TATE

"A splendid collection . . . done by editors who have a true feeling for poetic craftsmanship in all its glorious diversity."—DAVID DAICHES, *Saturday Review*

Each volume contains nearly 100,000 lines of verse, yet the price is ONLY $1.45 each.

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE POETS: Langland to Spenser

ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN POETS: Marlowe to Marvell

RESTORATION AND AUGUSTAN POETS: Milton to Goldsmith

ROMANTIC POETS: Blake to Poe

VICTORIAN AND EDWARDIAN POETS: Tennyson to Yeats

Now in handsome paper bindings!

THE GRAPES OF WRATH
by John Steinbeck $1.95

DEATH OF A SALESMAN
by Arthur Miller $.95

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ERNEST HEMINGWAY
by Charles A. Fenton $1.45

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED